



## **Milan Document on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation**

**29 January 2010**

*Below are some considerations coming out of a meeting in Milan organized by Pugwash and the University of Milan (Universita' degli Studi di Milano), 29 January 2010, with an eye to the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. The meeting involved more than 40 participants from 13 countries, including former defense and foreign ministers, current and former international disarmament diplomats and other scientific and policy experts.*

*While this document represents fairly the discussions held, it is the sole responsibility of Pugwash Secretary General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Professor of Physics, Universita' degli Studi di Milano and Pugwash President Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.*

The upcoming Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (May 2010, New York) will examine the treaty implementation and, in particular, the status of the three NPT basic pillars (disarmament, non proliferation and access to nuclear energy for peaceful uses by NPT members). It is an important opportunity to call the world's attention to the serious risks associated with nuclear weapons, and the ultimate need to eliminate such weapons and to work towards a legally-binding document (such as a convention) banning the possession of such weapons. *Work for such a legally binding document should begin soon and hopefully yield some concrete proposals before the 2015 NPT Review Conference.*

In the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference it will be extremely important, in order to prevent decay and breakdown of the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime, to show that concrete progress is being made towards that final goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and to reassure the world's public opinion that such progress will be strongly sustained in the future. In particular, in order to support concrete steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament, the *13 practical steps* approved by the 2000 NPT Review Conference should be restated by the 2010 NPT Review Conference with the necessary updates.

**Reinforce the (political and legal) commitments to nuclear disarmament. Drastically decrease the numbers of weapons**

1. The present number of intact nuclear weapons (reportedly over 23000) should be drastically reduced. The largest weapons reductions should of course be made by the two major nuclear weapon States (US and Russia) that possess about 95% of the world's combined nuclear arsenal. An effective ladder for scaling down the number of nuclear weapons of the most nuclear-armed nations should be clearly defined. As a first step, Russia and the US are expected to bring to successful conclusion, before the NPT Review Conference, their on-going negotiations, aimed at developing a successor treaty to their recently expired START 1 agreement.
2. Reductions of longer-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons should be vigorously pursued in nuclear negotiations. As in the past, unilateral actions can significantly contribute to this process. Decommissioned nuclear weapons should be dismantled and not only stored separately from delivery systems. Fissile material from dismantled weapons should be made accessible to the IAEA for inspection. Effective procedures for verifying weapon dismantlement should be actively pursued.
3. Active promotion of nuclear disarmament is the responsibility of all the members of NPT (in fact of all countries, even if nuclear-weapons states have a special responsibility in this regard). This implies that states with relatively smaller arsenals should do their share of the disarmament work. Also non-nuclear weapons countries hosting nuclear weapons belonging to other countries should send these weapons back to the owner and request their dismantlement. Finally all non-nuclear weapons states should pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons from their territories, not even allowing them in transit, by promoting nuclear-weapons-free zones. Extending nuclear-weapons-free zones can be seen as a complementary avenue to achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world.

**Reinforce the political and legal commitments to nuclear disarmament: decrease the military role and the political influence of nuclear arsenals**

4. The stated aim of nuclear weapons possession by nuclear-weapons states should be no more than to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. There is absolutely no need to keep any nuclear weapon at a high alert status. A high alert status entails a serious risk of a nuclear launch by mistake even now, 20 years after the end of the cold war.
5. Concepts like extended deterrence (meant in various ways as nuclear defense against non-nuclear attacks or the planning of the use of nuclear weapons to compensate conventional inferiority or to protect allies against possible nuclear or even chemical or biological weapons attacks) have shown to be of very limited value during the cold war and should be phased out. They should be replaced by a generalized no-first use posture by states possessing nuclear weapons. Moreover no-first use policies should be made even more explicit by extending security guarantees to states that do not possess nuclear weapons. Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the latter should be guaranteed that they will never be attacked with nuclear weapons.

6. Extended deterrence in no way should require the stationing of nuclear weapons on other countries' territories. An international norm should be developed, forbidding such extraterritorial deployments. European countries have a clear role to play in this respect and should take an active approach to fulfill their own responsibilities.
7. Possession of nuclear weapons is *not* an instrument for enhancing regional or global influence or political and economic leverage. This statement should be clearly understood and stated explicitly whenever useful. This notion, contrary to some conventional wisdom of the past, applies specifically to the major nuclear weapons states, where the possession of nuclear weapons is manifestly not of any help in dealing with military, political or economic crises.
8. Both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states should nevertheless exercise maximum restraint in the development of military applications of science and technology, such as ballistic missile defense, that could create potentially destabilizing situations, both in the regional and global context, thus complicating the task of reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons.
9. Nuclear-weapons states should develop internal structures, agencies, legislation, budget allocations and the like, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defense doctrines, and eventually to eliminate such weapons from national arsenals. "Modernization" and other forms of technical improvement and expansion of capabilities of existing arsenals should be prevented in all possible ways.

**Promote nuclear disarmament: involve the states that are not parties to the NPT**

10. States that are not parties to the NPT should be induced in all possible ways to eliminate their nuclear weapons and join the NPT. In the meantime they should be encouraged to support the general goals of the NPT by taking concrete steps in the direction of reducing their nuclear arsenals, preventing nuclear proliferation, opening up their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections and monitoring, respecting nuclear weapons-free-zones, and joining all possible other arms control treaties such as the CWC, BWC, CTBT, etc.

**Promote nuclear disarmament: make progress in the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (ME) and particularly of a nuclear-weapons-free zone**

11. The idea of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was an integral part of the success of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It has also been at various times and with various characterizations pushed forward by the main Middle Eastern states. It is important that the 2010 NPT Review Conference states unequivocally that concrete progress should be made in the creation of such a zone. Consultations should be organized involving all the Middle Eastern states aimed at defining an "agenda of progress" for a ME zone free of weapons of mass destruction. A UN-sponsored international conference should be called for, to discuss the implementation of the ME zone free of weapons of mass destruction and particularly of a nuclear-weapons-

free zone. The UN could appoint a coordinator to help the process of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destructions and particularly a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.

**Promote nuclear disarmament: ensure CTBT entry into force, push forward the FMCT**

12. The CTBT should be signed and ratified immediately by all those states that are bound by other treaties or agreements not to test nuclear weapons or that declared that they do not intend to test in the future. To do otherwise would just be a continuation of the practice of holding arms control treaties hostage to political pressures, irrespective of their actual value and merit. If some states continue to block entry into force of the CTBT, they will have to justify that position to the international community. Permanently ending nuclear testing for all and hence impeding new nuclear weapons developments and stopping the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes are all important elements supporting the goal of global nuclear disarmament. Regardless of the timing of the entry into force of the CTBT, the CTBT Organization in Vienna, should be strengthened.

**Prevent nuclear proliferation: strengthen the IAEA and the international monitoring & control regime**

13. In light of the present spread of nuclear activities for civilian purposes, it is clearly in the collective interest that all such activities be properly monitored and controlled by the competent international organization, namely the IAEA. The IAEA itself should be strengthened both in its workforce and in its ability to operate. The (model) additional protocol should be considered as the new norm, in terms of the relations between the agency and the member states. All members of the NPT should be encouraged to sign and ratify the (model) additional protocol.
14. Work should be pursued to develop improved proliferation-resistant technologies in all stages of the nuclear power production process.
15. Nuclear fuel production should be soon internationalized, without prejudice to the inalienable right recognized in Article IV of the treaty. International consortiums for enriching uranium and for the production of nuclear fuel should be encouraged and the monitoring of these international consortiums should be firmly in the hands of the IAEA. Phasing-out of reprocessing in favor of interim storage should also be encouraged<sup>1</sup>.
16. Efforts should be made to improve the monitoring capabilities of the IAEA beyond the additional protocol. A critical analysis of the problems, gaps and shortcomings of the monitoring systems should be made in the spirit of objective and constructive criticism.

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<sup>1</sup> Currently the world is dealing inadequately with 250 tons of already separated plutonium and the 70 tons of weapon-grade plutonium that Russia and U.S. have declared excess. Reprocessing costs more than interim storage and complicates radioactive waste management. For a non-nuclear state, it can provide a civilian pretext for creating a nuclear-weapon option.

**Prevent nuclear proliferation. Strengthen and harmonize national legislation to prevent illicit traffic of nuclear material and of technical devices that could be used in building nuclear weapons**

17. The effectiveness of resolution 1540 should be thoroughly examined. Countries should be encouraged to include in their legislation provisions to control, intercept and punish the illicit transfer of nuclear material (particularly of fissile material). The legislation should guarantee the possibility of intercepting illicit traffic of materials and technologies that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Dual-use materials and technologies should attract particular attention, and their transfer should be regulated by national legislation and international agreements. Because the availability of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) provides the most 'easy' avenue for manufacturing nuclear explosive devices by possible non-state actors, countries should be encouraged and helped to progressively phase out reactors using HEU and to replace them with reactors using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. The huge existing stocks of HEU, as well as the large amounts that will be obtained from nuclear disarmament, should be down-blended as quickly and as completely as possible to LEU (to be then employed as fuel for energy-producing nuclear reactors).

**Ensure the right of all NPT member-states to develop nuclear activities for civilian purposes**

18. The right of NPT parties to develop, research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is recognized under the treaty and should not be subject to constraints or limitations. This right should be exercised in accordance with the obligations prescribed by the treaty.
19. Assistance to civilian nuclear programs of member states should be guaranteed to all parties to the NPT without prejudice, while enforcing all the applicable control and monitoring activities.
20. Assisting the development of national nuclear energy programs of NPT member states should include also advising member states of all the risks and problems involved with civilian nuclear programs. Reference should be made to problems related with economic sustainability, with environmental concerns (including all the serious problems related to waste disposal), with the control and the training of technicians, with the organization of emergency responses in case of serious technical problems. This should happen of course without prejudice to the inalienable right guaranteed by article IV of the NPT.